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The Siamese Twin Operation and
Contemporary Catholic Medical Ethics
Francis X. Meehan

Father Meehan is an associate professor of moral theology at St.
Charles Seminary in Philadelphia.

In October, 1977 at Children's Hospital in Philadelphia, Dr. C. Everett Koop and a team of doctors and nurses performed a unique separation of Siamese twins. Dr. Koop had done similar dramatic surgery
before, but this was different; in this operation one of the children
would surely die. Within a week, Donald Drake, the Pulitzer prize
winning medical writer for the Philadelphia Inquirer, published an
extended account of the operation highlighting the ethical issues
involved.
A few days before the operation I was called into consultation by a
priest, who himself had been contacted by some nurses. These were
Catholic nurses, who were scheduled to assist at the operation, and
who were puzzled about the problem of the operation ending in the
death of one of the twins. An answer was needed quickly; there was
little time for research. On the basis of the medical data given me, I
immediately felt that from a Catholic moral standpoint, the operation
seemed a sound and ethically proper procedure. In Donald Drake 's
Inquirer account I am cited as giving the following reasons:
God expects us to act when we can act. Not to choose is to choose to allow
both of these babies to die . It was not the doctors who would be killing the
baby , because they would save the girl if they could, but the terminal event
that had already started for her. Death may come sooner - not because
they chose it for the child but as an indirect result of their attempt to save
the other child.

I was satisfied that he reported the substance of our interview
accurately. My aim in the interview was to state the reasons for the
licitness of this operation in such a way as to keep the case from
overflowing into other cases where one life could end up being "sacrificed" for another in a manner not in accord with Catholic teaching.
It is this latter concern that calls for a deeper and more careful analysis of some of the elements of the case. In the above citation I was
consciously speaking for the press and there one is conscious of the
ease in which a nuance can be missed. Now it may be of some help to
speak more fully about why the operation seemed a morally licit
endeavor.
Mav.1978
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Due Proportion: A First Look
For the sake of clarity let us start more traditionally by looking at
key elements of a double-effect analysis. According to a common
articulation of the principle, any action having two effects - one good
and one bad - is permissible, if 1) the good effect does not come by
means of the bad effect, and 2) there is a proportionate reason for
permitting the bad effect. There are more complete and more nuanced
articulations but these can serve sufficiently for our purpose here. It is
also important to note here that contemporary moral theology has, in
the past two decades, amassed an enormous body of literature on this
entire area of value conflict. Much of the literature, in attempting to
get at the base meaning of a long and healthy history of double-effect
casuistry, seems to be viewing proportion as the key hermeneutic
element.
In any case let us examine the operation of the Siamese twins
according to the two double-effect conditions as stated above. Taking
the second condition which states that there must be a proportionate
reason for permitting the bad effect, the operation at first glance at
least seems to be on safe ground. Not only was the operation necessary to save one twin's life, but it was also needed lest both twins died.
This first glance at the issue of proportion will be further analyzed as
we go on.
The first condition of the double-effect, namely that the good
effect does not come by means of the bad effect, is an important issue
in this case. In other words, there is the question of whether the effect
of saving Baby B's life is achieved by means of the death of Baby A. It
is important not because all ethical reasoning on this issue must follow
these categories of thought, but simply because these categories can
give us some initial ground from which to build some clarity into our
analysis. In the case of the operation on the twins, even though at first
sight there could seem to be a certain physical directness to the death
of Baby A, I nevertheless believe that a second look would uphold the
fact of Baby A's death being indirect. A careful analysis will confirm
that one is not achieving in this case a good end through an evil means.
At a crucial point in the operation, Dr. Koop tied off the carotid
artery feeding blood to the brain of Baby A. But this action, according
to the medical data I can gather, was far more an act of protecting
Baby B from the poisons that would start to pour into the blood as
soon as Baby A's tissues would begin to die. In other words even the
physical action could be seen as simultaneously an action of separation of the twins and an action of protection of the saved twin from
the poisons of the twin whose life is not able to be saved.
The analogy used by the Rabbis considering the case and also used
to obtain the court order was, I believe, basically a sound one, illustrating the point quite well: a mountain climber has fallen and is
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dangling on a rope attached to his friend. The friend cannot hold the
weight and both will soon fall to their death. He may then cut the
rope even though it will lead to his partner's death. In this case, even
though the cutting action could appear to physically cause the man to
fall, in reality it is merely an action of separation that is aimed at
protecting the only life that can be protected. The analogy holds
sufficiently then. There is, in Baby A's death, a moral indirectness that
even a deeper look at the physical facts supports. This way of moral
analysis in which one sees that the two conditions of double-effect are
fulfilled retains some validity today. A deeper critical look is required,
however, to assure that the double-effect analysis has not simply and
subtly become a wooden legalism covering up implicit assumptions.
Before we speak to that deeper criticism, we must first say a word
about another aspect of the problem.
Not a Form of Positive Euthanasia
One could anticipate an objection that Baby A would live longer if
the operation did not take place; and therefore, if we are excusing the
operation on the basis that the baby would die anyway, are we not
reasoning ourselves into something that could be made an equivalent
of a positive euthanasia? To someone looking at the case of Siamese
twins, such an objection could be nitpicking. However, it is a serious
objection because of its social implications. It is most important in
solving one case that we verbalize our decision in a manner that does
not throw open the doors of disrespect for human dignity in other
cases. So it is quite right to object that it is not enough to say that one
of the twins would die anyway, for then what is to prevent us from
saying the same thing with regard to anyone who is terminally ill? One
could quickly imagine that as soon as a poor person's diagnosis
reached the university hospital's lab, eager young professionals would
be coveting certain organs for transplant to save the more "useful"
people. The objection does call for a serious answer.
For the purpose of clarity, I would first speak of a traditional
formulation of ordinary and extraordinary means to get at the problem. And here one cannot forget that we are dealing with a case of
Siamese twins, and precisely a case where the means of sustaining the
life of Baby A is now not a machine but the potentially and rightfully
autonomous body of Baby B. That is, Baby B has some right not to
have her body used as a means of keeping Baby A alive precisely in a
manner that will definitively lead to the death of both. In this case
clearly the limited protection offered by Baby B's body given at the
expense of her life would constitute an extraordinary and therefore
unrequired means. The death of Baby A is coming from its own pathology of incompleteness and not from any positive act of euthanasia
on the part of the doctor. While the use of these categories of ordinary
May, 1978
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and extraordinary means may, in this case, seem strained, it will help
to realize that the purpose for using them is not so much to solve the
case as to indicate as invalid any assumption that we are allowing a
form of positive euthanasia.
Moreover, since we have used terminology about rights over one's
body, it would be important to indicate why a positive solution to this
case does not lead to principles allowing for abortion. Admittedly, the
very language could not help but remind us of the argument for abor·
tion used in certain quarters, namely, the woman's right over her
body. The case here is quite different. The slogan in its common usage
proclaims a right over one's body in that individualistic sense that does
not measure the rights of the fetus to life. Here, on the contrary, we
have felt it necessary to consider Baby A 's rights and to evaluate them
within some hierarchy of values. Here Baby B's right over her body is
taking clear precedence only in the face of the threat of death to both.
The parallel then to this case is not just any abortion but only a case
where an omission of medical intervention would lead to the death of
both fetus and woman. This hierarchy of values is in continuity with
Catholic teaching which has, in the case of a canceroils uterus or an
ectopic pregnancy, allowed a separation that indirectly brings an earlier death to the fetus, which fetus would not have been able to
survive anyway.
A Deeper Look at Proportion
I have so far spoken of the case using somewhat traditional Catholic
terms such as direct and indirect, ordinary and extraordinary means.
This offers an advantage of a certain clarity. However, recent studies
examining the double-effect principle have persuasively shown that in
our effort to prove that a good effect does not come through a bad
effect, we sometimes are controlled more by a judgment of proportion
already made even if implicitly made. Moreover, not always has even
the best of Catholic casuistry confined itself to analyzing a conflict of
values case within double effect categories. Sometimes a previous judgment of proportion forces the ushering in of new principles.
For example, the severing of an arm in order to keep a man's body
from being mangled in a machine has always been allowed. Yet the
severing of an arm would be an evil means to a good end if we were
applying double-effect mechanistically. In an effort to articulate why
the instinctive solution was correct, a principle of totality would
wisely be brought in since an appeal to a literal sense of double-effect
would lead to a solution that went against common sense. This principle of totality states basically what everyone knows, namely, that a
part of the body can be mutilated for the sake of the health and life of
the total organism. Here note that even though physically - at first
glance at least - the good effect seems to be coming through the bad
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effect, nevertheless a very human sense of proportion forces us into
deeper analysis and the invocation of another and equally valid
principle.
A similar dynamism was contained in the historical discussion of
kidney transplants. There was a recognition that a strict mechanistic
application of double-effect would find here that the good effect of a
saved life came through the evil means of the donor's mutilation of his
own body. Yet there was an instinctive recognition that the transplant
was licit. Again a certain sense of proportion forced moralists into new
principles, here, for example an overarching principle of charity (if
one can give a life, then certainly one of two organs), or into a deeper
analysis of the human action.
A similar reasoning has been present in the Church for centuries
whenever it came to discussing self-defense. Some would try to use
double-effect with some difficulty; others would recognize that a right
to self-defense would have to stand autonomously as its own principle
since any effort at reducing it to a double-effect application would be
strained. The point is that even if double-effect were to be used, the
very arrangement of what was considered an effect would indicate
that a judgment of proportion was a more fundamental and controlling determination.
This review of an extensive literature of two decades (admittedly
too broad a review) allows us to say a word directly related to the
separation of the Siamese twins. Let me state some principal elements
of proportion in this case.
The very first judgment of proportion, which the facts of the case
force upon us, is this: To save the life of one twin is better than to
save the life of neither. The medical fact was that the twins could not
both live while still united. If nothing was done, then both would die.
Medically it has been stated that in cases where twins have been joined
at the heart in the way in which these twins were joined, neither one
had ever lived more than nine months.
A second point which is more a corollary of the above is that losing
the life of one of the twins does have a reluctant acceptability because
there is an acceptable proportion in the fact that the only life that can
be saved will be saved. Great care is needed here. Proportion is an
ambiguous word. There is a hierarchy of values underlying each one's
sense of proportion, and as Marx would have it, each class's sense of
proportion. For example, not to dislocate the labor distribution on
the domestic front has been seen as a value significant enough to
deprive Third World countries of an untariffed market outlet for their
manufactured goods. Certain ideologies limit one's imagination for
alternatives. Here the value attached to the nation state predetermines the judgment of proportion. I make this point quickly from
another field simply to give quick allusion to how slippery a term
May, 1978
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proportion can be, and how subject our sense of proportion can be to
subtle cultural influences.
In the case at hand then when we say that the loss of one life is in
acceptable proportion to saving another life, we must give quick and
careful qualification lest such an equation of proportion be understood wrongly.
We are not speaking of a mere equation of quantity as though it is
enough to say that one life is proportionate to one life, or as though it
would be immediately acceptable to take a life as long as a life is being
saved. This too easily becomes a utilitarianism that may begin with a
certain respectability but in the end has a way of extending itself into
a deep disrespect for human dignity. One person's life is never subordinate to another's. Each life has an autonomous and inalienable
dignity; it is an end in itself, not a means to a "proportionate" good.
Therefore the proportion in this case is not merely a life for a life,
but rather a life·that-is·able-to-be-saved over against one-that-is-notable-to-be-saved. Moreover the "not-able-to-be-saved" quality of Child
A is not due to a willful intention of the doctor but due rather to an
event beyond the doctor's will and capacity, namely an event equivalent to a terminal illness already afflicting Child A. In this case in layman's language there was only one and one-half hearts. Baby girl A had
on~y a stunted two chamber heart. The hearts were fused ima manner
that prevented a neat separation that could have saved both. Therefore
it is key here that the proportion is not to be articulated as though it
were a killing of Baby A in order to save Baby B. Rather it is a saving
of Baby B that incidentally and unavoidably allows the terminal illness
of Baby A to take its course.
Is Death Direct or Indirect?
This carefulness in making qualifications to some may seem to be
excessive analysis. Yet in the background of some contemporary situa·
tions, this carefulness is important. In an American context where
Puerto Rican women can be chosen to test fertility pills, where black
men can be used to test the ravages of syphilis without the aid of
antibiotics, where a national commission was needed to moderate fetal
experimentation, in such a context efforts at distinctions that may
seem tiresome to some are, in the end, a necessary effort at keeping a
civilization civilized. So far in this paper my purpose has been to
articulate the solution of the case in a way that would keep it within
careful limits. This would prevent the case from becoming a precedent
for later abuse in situations that are only apparently similar, but not
really.
I have basically covered three points. First I have given a brief
explanation on the concept of proportion. Secondly, I determined
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that the good effect did not come by means of the evil effect. Thirdly,
I enlarged upon the point of proportion. Finally, I would say a few
words on why the life of Baby B is not occurring by means of the
killing of Baby A. This, in other words, is the question of whether the
death of Baby A is direct or indirect. I have already shown in our
second point that it was indirect, but there may be still uneasiness for
some since, in fact, the cessation of blood supply to the brain of Baby
A could seem to some to have a certain directness to it. So let me add
a word on this.
One of the points recognized in the conflict-of-values discussion in
Catholic moral theology of the past decades is precisely the difficulty
of determining what is direct and what is indirect. An excessive physicalism looks at the words direct and indirect as reflecting purely
physical realities and loses sight of the full indivisible human action.
The cutting off of the blood supply to Baby A may happen first
physically, but that does not mean it is a morally direct action. An
analogy can be found in self-defense. The killing of the aggressor may
be physically direct, but morally it is an indirect effect of saving
myself. One can immediately see how a view of proportion can be the
controlling factor as to what in an individual case can be considered
direct or indirect.
In this case I have earlier indicated that the action of the doctor
tying the artery carrying the blood supply to the brain of Baby A was
not to be seen as an act of killing to prepare for a separate act of
saving. Rather the tying of the artery was an integral part of the one
single act of separation and protection of the viable twin. I have
argued that therefore Baby A's death was indirect not only with an
intentional indirectness, but that this intentional indirectness was even
in this case reflected physically.
It is not as though we can neglect physical realities in this case or
any case and appeal too vaguely to intentionality or to a sense of proportion. For while we are avoiding too physical an understanding of
direct and indirect, we must also avoid falling into the opposite extreme of pure intentionalism. Human intention is limited by physical
realities. I cannot kill a man simply because I need a heart for transplant and then call the killing indirect simply because my intention is
to save another man. Humans are not only intention-making creatures.
Rather we are bodies-in-the-world. My intention to save is limited by
physical possibilities that are inherently tied to the dignity of other
individuals. So theologians grope for a middle ground that tries to
articulate sensible solutions in careful enough ways to avoid slippery
slopes to social abuse.

In this case we are arguing that Baby A's death is a morally indirect
effect. It is an inevitable side effect and therefore not a bad means to a
good end. Thus, in so arguing we are not appealing to good intentions
May, 1978
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alone. Rather the moral indirectness of Baby A's death is reflected in
the physical realities of the case, namely, the impossibility of saving
both children, the union of their bodies in such a way that there is life
support enough for only one, the fact that, if nothing is done, both
will die. These realities give flesh to the concept of moral indirectness.
They are such as to allow that the death of Baby A is unintended and
that it is therefore not a morally evil means, but rather a premoral
physical incidental misfortune. The total reality of the case then
assures that a life can be saved without intentionally violating the
dignity of anyone. And this in the end is what the tradition of Catholic medical ethics and the double-effect principle are all about.
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